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Abstract
We compare development and learning of the visual control of movement from an ecological perspec-
tive. It is argued that although the constraints that are imposed upon development and learning are vastly
different, both are best characterised as a change towards the use of more useful and specifying optic
variables. Implicit learning, in which awareness is drawn away from movement execution, is most appro-
priate to accomplish this change in optic variable use, although its contribution in development is more
contentious. Alternatively, learning can also be affected by explicit processes. We propose that explicit
learning would typically invoke vision for perception processes instead of the designated vision for action
processes. It is for that reason that after explicit learning performance is more easily compromised in the
face of pressure or disorders. We present a way to deal with the issue of explicit learning during infancy.
© 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Perhaps the most powerful portrayal of development is Shirley’s black silhouetted infants
laid down in a chronological series of motor milestones. It readily conveys the message that de-
velopment normally proceeds with great regularity and inevitability. We can outline the age and
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sequences of these motor milestones, and much other behaviour, quite reliable. This portrayal
lent itself to prescriptive theories of development that sought the source of developmental order
within the organism (see Pick, 2003). Today these neuro-maturational perspectives are rightly
rejected, and alternative theories have been proposed -most notably the dynamic systems per-
spective advocated by Thelen and Smith (1994). In short, developmental change is thought to
emerge from context-dependent dynamic interactions of multiple factors. Not a single cause,
either genetic or environmental, but all factors and context determine developmental change.
Although the benefits of the dynamical systems perspective for the understanding of develop-
mental change are without question, the emphasis on the process of change might obscure the
factor age as an essential characteristic of development. For example, Thelen and Smith (1994,
p. xviii) list several goals which they believe to be essential for a theory of development, the
most important of which is an understanding where novel behaviour comes from. However,
the issue of the origin of novelty, like any of the other listed goals, is not restricted to the
domain of development, but is also dealt with in theories of learning. Rather than a theory of
developmental change the dynamic systems perspective may be defined more appropriately as
a general theory of change. It remains silent with respect to one of the core messages conveyed
by Shirley’s black silhouetted infants; that we can outline the age of the motor milestones quite
reliable. It is this apparent omission of the age variable that leads us to fall back on the work
of Wohlwill.
Wohlwill (1970, 1973) contended that the changes with age constitute an inherent charac-
teristic of development. He further argued that age should be conceptualised as part and parcel
of the dependent variable in developmental studies. To illustrate his claim, he refers to the vari-
able time in studies of adult perceptual adaptation. Like development, perceptual adaptation
is thought to involve systematic changes in behaviour over time. In studies of dark adaptation
changes in threshold over time are charted without attributing any causal significance to the
time variable itself. Independent variables are introduced to show the role of factors such as
wavelength or the size of the retinal field on the rate of adaptation. This demonstrates how
different parameters influence the course of adaptation. These changes in the dark-adaptation
curve constitute an inherent characteristic of the perceptual system, and may be explained
in terms of physiological processes. Changes over time, however, remain essential to the de-
scription of the adaptation process. Hence, researchers in perceptual adaptation do not aim to
manipulate variables for which time could be considered to represent a mere shorthand (see
Wohlwill, 1970, p. 53; 1973, p. 23).
According to Wohlwill, the place of time in perceptual adaptation studies, or the number of
trials in studies of learning, is similar to the place of age in developmental studies. Therewith
the task for developmental studies becomes first of all one of describing the form or mode of
the relationship between age and the changes observed to occur in some behavioural variable
over the course of development. Only those behavioural variables qualify as developmental
for which changes with age (in terms of direction, sequence, shape, etc.) remain invariant
over a broad range of particular environmental conditions or circumstances, as well as genetic
characteristics (Wohlwill, 1970, p. 52). In this respect, Wohlwill points to the development
of speech, space perception and also to motor development -the topic of the present paper.
Thus, as far as changes in, for instance, prehension and locomotion occur in a vast majority of
infants in the most diverse environments and under the most varied conditions of experience in
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most cultural groups and typically within a fairly narrowly delimited age period, they can be
considered as true developmental phenomena. In contrast, changes over time (or even with age)
observed only for individuals subjected to specific experiences, such as skills acquired through
directed teaching in racquet sport, would qualify as learning and not as development. Wohlwill
(1970) emphasised that his distinction is not similar to the one McGraw introduced between
phylogenetic and ontogenetic behaviours. Developmental variables are not to be conceived as
independent of environmental influences. What is meant is that the occurrence of change with
age is independent of specific environmental conditions; it cannot be produced by experimental
manipulation. To be sure, Wohlwill adds that an investigator should not be content with merely
observing developmental change. The limitations of experimental manipulation of particular
variables, however, should also be recognised; it can only affect the course of such change
(e.g., the rate of development).
Wohlwill’s conceptualisation forms the working assumption in our inquiry into the changes
over time in how vision guides action during development (e.g., eye blinking, grasping, etc.)
and learning (e.g., returning a tennis serve). Our aim is to provide a description of these changes
from the ecological perspective (Gibson, 1979), in which for the greater part we shall restrict
ourselves to changes governing the visual control of movement. We specifically ask whether
the form of the relationship between age and the changes that occur in the visual control of
movement during development is similar to the relationship between amount of practice and
the changes that occur in the visual control of movement during learning. To this end, we
describe how the visual control of movement is organised (i.e., vision for action and vision for
perception), and how the changes over time in the visual control of movement during devel-
opment and learning can be characterised (i.e., the education of attention). We then explore
how attention-specific processes (i.e., implicit and explicit learning) can differentially facili-
tate these changes during learning. We end by speculating whether similar attention-specific
processes might also influence the course, as opposed to the occurrence (!), of the development
of the visual control of movement during infancy.
2. The organisation of the visual control of movement
2.1. Vision for action and vision for perception
Recently proponents of the ecological perspective have endorsed the view that our visual
system can be classified into two subsystems with different functions (e.g., Michaels, 2000;
Pagano & Bingham, 1998; Van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Rosengren, 2001; see Fig. 1). On the
one hand, a dorsal stream can be discerned that uses visual information to control goal-directed
movements, that is, to tune these movements to the requirements of the environment (i.e., vision
for action). On the other hand, a ventral stream can be distinguished that encompasses the use
of visual information to obtain knowledge of the environment and the self (i.e., vision for per-
ception). This separation between vision for action and vision for perception has been adopted
from recent ideas, most notably those of Milner and Goodale (1995; see also Bridgeman,
Kirch, & Sperling, 1981; Jeannerrod, 1997). However, the original ideas clearly depart from
the ecological perspective in the sense that they bear an unmistakably computational and repre-
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Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the separation between vision for action and vision for perception. The dotted
line in the “information box” illustrates that distinct sources of visual information may be involved in action and
perception.
sentational flavour. A distinction based upon the way visual cues are transformed and encoded
by the brain would not be acceptable to proponents of the ecological perspective. Therefore,
the ecological perspective proposes an information-based distinction between vision for action
and vision for perception in terms of the type of the visual information sources that is used
and the manner in which the sources of information are used (Van der Kamp & Savelsbergh,
2000).
Table 1 summarises the most salient information-based differences between vision for action
and vision for perception (extensive reviews can be found in Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Goodale &
Humphrey, 1998; Michaels, 2000; Norman, 2002; Rossetti, 1998; Rossetti & Pisella, 2002; Van
der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2000). Here it suffices to say that the visual control of goal-directed
movements (i.e., vision for action) is a process that primarily but not exclusively involves
egocentric sources of information, is fast, short-lived and implicit. For example, in prehen-
sion grasping movements are mainly based upon information that specifies size and distance
of an object in relation to the aperture of the hand. The use of information to guide hand
aperture is, and must be, an almost instantaneous (“on-line”) process about which one is not
aware, otherwise performance would be disturbed. Instead, obtaining knowledge of the en-
vironment or the self (i.e., vision for perception) is considered to be a slow, long-lived, and
Table 1
Information-based differences in vision for action and vision for perception
Information Vision for action Vision for perception Study
Sources Egocentric Allocentric Bridgeman et al. (1981)
Monocular dynamic
and binocular
Monocular static (pictorial) Marotta, Behrmann,
and Goodale (1997)
Peripheral and central
field of view
Central field of view Goodale and Murphy (1996)
Control features Fast (on-line), short-lived Slow, long-lived Bridgeman et al. (1997)
Implicit, unaware Explicit, aware Rossetti (1998)
Control Perception of affordances Passingham and Toni (2001)
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mostly explicit process that primarily but not exclusively involves allocentric sources of visual
information. Thus the perception of object characteristics is much more reliant on informa-
tion that specifies, for instance, the size of an object in relation to the sizes of surrounding
objects. The perceiver is aware of what she or he sees (e.g., it can be verbalised), even long
after the event has been presented. In addition, several authors (e.g., Goodale, 1998; Goodale &
Humphrey, 1998; Passingham & Toni, 2001) have stressed that the knowledge obtained through
vision for perception also enables actors to identify the goal for action or to decide about
the appropriate action. That is, vision for perception encompasses the perception of what
the situation affords for action (see Postma, Van der Lubbe, & Zuidhoek, 2002; Van der
Kamp et al., 2001). However, it is the vision for action system that controls the execution of
actions.
2.2. An alternative route of movement control
Although most attention has been focussed on the dissociation, it is clear that both visual
systems are closely intertwined in the course of action (Rossetti & Pisella, 2002). That is,
apart from the specialised vision for action system, which is fast and implicit, goal-directed
movements can be controlled by the vision for perception system as well. However, the visual
control of movement is thought to be organised through this alternative route only under specific
conditions. An imposed time delay between the detection of information and the initiation of
the movement is one of these circumstances. For instance, Gentilucci, Chieffi, Daprati, Saetti,
and Toni (1996) required healthy participants to point from one to the other arrow end of two
types of the Müller–Lyer illusion (i.e., with arrows directed to or away from the centre of
the line). The effect of the illusion on pointing was very weak under full vision. However,
the pointing distance was increased or shortened according to the type of illusion when the
movement was started after an imposed delay between the presentation of the visual illusion
and the execution of the pointing movement. This finding suggests that delayed actions induce
movement control based on allocentric sources of information (i.e., the arrow ends are taken
into account) and thus organised via the slow and explicit vision for perception system (see
also Bridgeman, Peery, & Anand, 1997; Carrozzo, Stratta, McIntyre, & Lacquaniti, 2002;
Westwood, McEachern, & Roy, 2001).
A second condition in which the vision for perception system may be involved in move-
ment control is when the execution of movement is accompanied by an explicit verbalisation.
Rossetti (1998) reports a study where participants were presented an array of visual targets.
The participants had to point to the target that changed colour as soon as the targets disappeared
from screen (i.e., pointing without vision after zero time delay). In one of the conditions, par-
ticipants were required to speak aloud the number associated with the pointed target during
each movement. In contrast to the errors of the pointing movements without verbalisation,
which were aligned with the movement direction, the pointing errors in this specific target
verbalisation condition (but not in other non-sense verbalisation conditions) were aligned with
the surrounding target array (see also Carrozzo et al., 2002; Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani,
Daprati, & Gangitano, 2000). This suggests that verbalisation during movement execution
induced movement control based on allocentric sources of information and thus organised
through the vision for perception system.
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In sum, both a specialised and an alternative route to the visual control of goal-directed
movement can be distinguished. Normally, it is the vision for action system that is designated
to control movement. However, it is likely that both time delays and explicit verbalisations
perturb or even suppress the specialised vision for action system, and enforce the involvement
of the route through the vision for perception system (Rossetti, 1998). In this case, however, the
control of goal-directed movement has changed into a slow and explicit step-by-step process
that primarily uses allocentric sources of visual information.
2.3. A note on the development of the vision for action and vision for perception systems
Before we turn to the types of change that underlie the development and learning of the
visual control of goal-directed movements, we briefly discuss arguments concerning the origin
and development of the dissociated vision for action and vision for perception systems. Several
authors have recently reasoned that vision for action and vision for perception follow different
developmental trajectories from birth. Hence, in contrast to most traditional theories of devel-
opment (e.g., Piaget, 1952), neither vision for action nor vision for perception is considered as
privileged in development. The two are thought to develop independently (Bertenthal, 1996;
Van der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2000, 2002) and at different rates (Atkinson, 2000; Kovács,
2000; Newman, Atkinson, & Braddick, 2001). In addition, it is hypothesised that ego- and
allocentric sources of information contribute differently to the developmental changes within
vision for action and vision for perception (Kaufman, Mareschal, & Johnson, 2003; Van der
Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2000). For instance, Wattam-Bell (1996 in Atkinson, 2000) found that
the perception of direction of motion after 10 weeks of age is exclusively based on relative
motion, that is, the direction of a target in relation to its background (i.e., allocentric informa-
tion). It was only several weeks later that infants were able to distinguish different directions
of motion on basis of absolute direction of motion of the target without a background (i.e.,
egocentric information). In contrast, Von Hofsten, who found that even newborns direct their
arm to a moving object, concludes that within the early development of reaching “. . . the
infant reaches in reference to a coordinate system fixed to the moving object instead of to a
static background” (Von Hofsten, 1983, p. 84). Observations like these show the potential of
obtaining insight in the issue of dissociation during development between vision for action
and vision for perception by examining the differential roles of ego- and allocentric sources of
information.
However, plausible these arguments might seem, it is important to bear in mind that the
hypothesis of vision for action and vision for perception following different developmental
trajectories has not been directly tested in infants. The evidence so far mainly stems from
age-based comparisons of the findings from various studies. There are a few studies that
examined the effects of visual illusions on the control of arm movements in young children
between 5 and 12 years of age (Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, & Gangitano, 2001; Hanisch,
Konczak, & Dohle, 2001). The findings are difficult to interpret, but they do seem to suggest
that visual illusions may affect arm movements to a greater extent in children than in adults.
This might suggest that the relative contribution of allocentric sources of information, and
hence the vision for perception system, during the visual control of movement is somewhat
larger in young children than in adults.
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3. The ecological perspective to development and learning
3.1. The state of the ecological perspective
Almost 10 years ago, Michaels and Beek (1995) made the following provocative character-
isation about the state of the ecological perspective with respect to development and learning:
“Unfortunately, empirical work on learning within the direct perception school appears limited
to demonstrating that learning occurs (or does not have to occur, as in the case of new-borns
and looming), and theory is little more than a collection of slogans and metaphors” (p. 273).
This collection of slogans and metaphors, according to Michaels and Beek, consists of not
more than the portrayal of learning as the education of attention (Gibson, 1966) or as percep-
tual differentiation (Gibson, 1966; Gibson & Gibson, 1955). This may be regarded as a harsh
statement, certainly given the large body of literature on the development of the perception
of affordances (e.g., Gibson, 1969, 1988; see also Eppler & Adolph, 1996). Nevertheless, the
theoretical basis for studying development and learning at the time could perhaps be consid-
ered as a little shallow. Several investigators have suited the action by the word and proposed
a broader ecological theory of development and learning (Jacobs & Michaels, 2002; Jacobs,
2001; Runeson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2000; see also Van Hof, Van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh,
2004).
In the present section, we aim to describe the form of change over time in the visual control
of movement during development and learning. The ecological perspective holds that there is
a lawful relation between visual information and movement (Warren, 1988; see also Jacobs,
2001). In its simplest appearance, the so-called law of control for a certain action can be
formally expressed as
M(t) = a+ b× I(t),
where M(t) stands for a particular movement variable, I(t) stands for a particular optic variable,
and a and b stand for tuning constants. The law of control describes the action as the on-line
coupling between optic and movement variables. Lee, Young, Reddish, Lough, and Clayton
(1983) provide a well-known example of such a control law for the visual control of timing
the leap to punch a falling ball. They show that change in knee angle (i.e., α(t)) is a function of
the optical variable tau (i.e., τ(t)), which specifies current distance of the falling ball divided
by approach velocity. The constants are thought to represent adaptive adjustments in linking
the visual information to the leg movement. If we assume that goal-directed movements are
indeed lawfully controlled by visual information than three types of changes can be discerned
that underlie its development and learning: the discovery of a law of control, the education
of attention, and calibration. The first comprises the establishment of an appropriate law of
control, the second refers to a change of the optic variable that enters a particular control
law, and the last concerns an adaptive change in the relation between the movement and optic
variables. Below, we summarise the current evidence for these types of change over the course
of development and learning. We will conclude that a change towards the use of a more useful
and specifying optic variable is the most appropriate description of the form of change over
time of the visual control of movement.
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3.2. Types of change
3.2.1. The discovery of the law of control
A manifold of actions may be possible in an environment, but infants or beginner learners
still have to discover what the environment affords for action. An intricate element of this pro-
cess is the establishment or formation of a law of control. That is, finding an appropriate action
cannot be comprehended apart from discovering an appropriate coupling between information
and movement. There is a dearth of studies, however, that explicitly focus on the set-up of
action (i.e., the formation of the control law). The majority of ecologically based develop-
mental studies, for instance, appear to be concerned mainly with the process of discovering
affordances for locomotion (e.g., Adolph, 1997; Gibson et al., 1987; Gibson & Walk, 1960) or
prehension (e.g., Needham, Barrett, & Peterman, 2002; Yonas & Hartman, 1993). These stud-
ies demonstrate the active nature of the infants’ search of what the environment affords, or put
it differently, what actions are appropriate to actualise. For example, infants look around, touch
and feel sometimes with both the hands and feet, shift posture and so on to explore whether
a ground, cliff or slope is crossable. It is convincingly shown that exploration for action is
not a blind random search; it is specific for the to-be-perceived environmental properties (e.g.,
Gibson et al., 1987) and specific for each action or posture (e.g., Adolph, 2000; Gibson et al.,
1987). If we assume that this exploratory behaviour of the infants encompasses the search for
and the formation of a lawful relation between movement and information, then these studies
would suggest that the discovery of an appropriate law of control is information based (cf.
Jacobs, 2001).
In the area of learning, the evidence for the process of the discovery of the law of control
is even more circumstantial. Nevertheless, studies that examine novice-expert differences in
visual search patterns during interceptive actions might shed some light on the issue. In rac-
quet sport, for instance, performers face severe spatial and temporal task constraints. Hence,
players preparing to receive a ball or shuttle must begin initiating their movements very early,
mostly before the opponent has completed his stroke. A novice first has to make sense of what
actions can be actualised, that is, how to set-up an appropriate coupling between movement
and information. Caraugh and Janelle (2002) report that the visual search patterns of novices
and experts when presented with various dynamic presentations of serves and ground strokes
were markedly different. The visual search patterns of the novices were scattered in highly
variable manner to various locations, irrespective of the opponent’s stroke and rather inconsis-
tent from presentation to presentation. It appears then that the beginner player is in the process
of discovering the affordances; he is visually exploring the situation to find out what actions
are appropriate.1 The experts, in contrast, already knew the affordances of the situation. They
exhibited stroke-specific visual search patterns clustered around specific locations that were
highly consistent across multiple presentations (Caraugh & Janelle, 2002; see also Savelsbergh,
Van der Kamp, Oudejans, & Scott, 2004).
3.2.2. The education of attention
The same action may be actualised by coupling different optic variables to the same move-
ment variable. Hence, a change over time in development and learning may be described as a
change in the optic variable that is incorporated in the law of control. This is where Gibson
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(1966) introduced the process of education of attention, which is described as “a greater notic-
ing of the critical differences with less noticing of irrelevancies” and “a progressive focusing or
centering of the perceptual system” (Gibson, 1966, p. 52), or as an “optimization of attention”
(Gibson, 1969, pp. 456–462). Jacobs and Michaels (2002) argue that this “optimatization of
attention” entails a change from detecting non-specifying to specifying2 variables (see also
Oudejans, Bleijendaal, Koedijker, & Bakker, 2003). Only when a perceiver detects a variable
that specifies the property that she or he intends to perceive, attention is appropriately educated.
Eleanor Gibson has often (e.g., Gibson, 1969; Gibson & Pick, 2001) pointed at this process
as one of selection or differentiation, where the perceiver is “narrowing down from a vast
manifold of information to the minimal, optimal information that specifies the affordance of
an event, object or layout” (Gibson & Pick, 2001, pp. 150–151).
Recently, Kayed and Van der Meer (2000) have made observations that hint to the education
of attention as a process that underlies changes in the control of defensive blinking to optical
collisions during infancy. In a cross-sectional study, these authors found that 6–7-month-old
infants blinked when the relative rate of expansion of the optical pattern (i.e., tau) generated on a
shadow-caster reached a critical value. The detection of this variable allowed the infants to blink
in time under different constant velocity and constant accelerative approaches of the virtual
object. Hence, these infants appeared to have appropriately directed their attention to the speci-
fying variable. The 5–6-month-old infants, in contrast, did not cope successfully with all the vir-
tual object’s approaches, the fastest accelerative approach resulted in late blinking. It was shown
that this was due to the younger infants’ using a threshold optical angle, a non-specifying vari-
able that leads to less appropriate blinks. A similar change towards the use of more useful optic
variables around 6 months has recently been observed for the development of catching moving
objects (Van Hof & Van der Kamp, 2003; see also Van der Meer, Van der Weel, & Lee, 1994).
Examples of expertise differences that indicate changes in optical variable use in the visual
control of movement are also available from the motor learning literature (see Caraugh &
Janelle, 2002; Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999). Occlusion paradigms in racquet sports, in
which either the temporal or spatial characteristics of an event (e.g., an opponent’s service) are
selectively obstructed from view, indicate that experts use sources of information that occur
earlier in the proximal-to-distal unfolding action of the opponent than do novices and interme-
diates. More specifically, several studies suggest that novices primarily rely on sources of in-
formation related to early ball flight and racquet displacement, whereas experts also used infor-
mation generated by—in particular—movement of the playing arm and the trunk rotation to get
at the right place at the right time (e.g., Abernethy, 1990; Abernethy & Russell, 1987). It is this
difference in the attended optic variables that appears to account for the skill-related variability
in performance. In sum, the education of attention seems an important process underlying both
the development and learning of the visual control of movement. However, the evidence would
even be more convincing if there was not such a paucity of longitudinal studies. Ultimately, a
longitudinal methodology, and not the present age- and skill-based comparisons, is needed to
chart change with age or change with practice (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wohlwill, 1973).
3.2.3. Calibration
The third process underlying improvements in the visual control of movement that can be
distinguished is calibration. Calibration is the process of tuning and maintaining the specific
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relation between the attended optic variable and the unfolding movement (Jacobs, 2001; Jacobs
& Michaels, 2002). The study of Jacobs (2001) in which participants learned to catch a ball
that approached from different angles may serve as an example. Improvements in performance
were found to go hand in hand with catchers adjusting the threshold of the involved optic
variables, which can be represented by a change in tuning constant b in the law of control.
Only occasionally were improvements in performance based upon a change in optical variable
on which the control of the movement was based (i.e., education of attention). Unfortunately,
we found no other studies assessing the process of calibration in relation to developmental or
learning changes of the visually control of movement—although there is a wealth of evidence
about calibration from adaptation studies (e.g., Van der Kamp, Bennett, Savelsbergh, & Davids,
1999; Withagen & Michaels, 2002).
3.3. Commonalities in the form of change during development and learning
The ecological perspective describes three types of changes that underlie development and
learning of the visual control of goal-directed movements. First, an appropriate coupling be-
tween movement and information needs to be discovered by the infant or beginner learner.
In view of the characteristics of the vision for action and vision for perception systems, the
establishment of a law of control reveals the integration between the two systems. Although a
law of control itself represents the activity of the vision for action system, the set-up of action
(i.e., the establishment of the control law) is constrained by the perception of what the situation
affords (Goodale, 1998; Passingham & Toni, 2001; Van der Kamp et al., 2001). Hence, it is the
integration between vision for perception and vision for action that is subject to changes due
to the discovery of a law of control. Once a law of control is established, change over time can
be induced by either a change of the optical variable (i.e., education of attention) or a change
in the relation between the movement and optic variables (i.e., calibration) or both. It is vision
for action that is liable to these types of changes.
If we weigh the empirical support of these three types of change of the visual control of
movement during development and learning, only the support for the education of attention
can reasonably be considered as credible. In contrast, the current empirical support for the
discovery of the law of control and calibration is still largely lacking. Taking these reserva-
tions into account, the evidence suggests that both the form of change that occurs in the visual
control of movement during development and the form of change that occurs during learning
can be characterised as a change towards the use of more useful and specifying optic variables.
Whether it concerned improvements during the development in the visual control of eye blink-
ing (Kayed & Van der Meer, 2000) and catching (Van Hof & Van der Kamp, 2003) around 6
months, the development of the visual control of postural stability while standing or walking
after 18 months of age (Stoffregen, Schmuckler, & Gibson, 1987) or improvements during
the learning to visually control the return of an opponent’s stroke in racquet sports (Caraugh
& Janelle, 2002) or visually control the interception of a moving object (Jacobs, 2001), the
observed changes were always found to be consistent with a change in optical variable use.
Hence, even though the constraints that are imposed upon development and learning are vastly
different, the form of the relationship between age and the change that occurs in the visual
control of movement during development is similar to the relationship between the amount of
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practice and the change that occurs in the visual control of movement during learning. That is
not to say, however, that development and learning to visual control of movement are identical
processes. The two may well be distinguished according to the (independent) variables that
affect the course of change (e.g., the rate of change) during development and learning, as op-
posed to the occurrence of change (cf. Wohlwill, 1973). One such variable, to which we turn
in the remainder of this article, may be related to how the infant’s or learner’s attention can be
“educated.” To this end, we first go over the recent debate pertaining to the focus of attention
during learning to visually control goal-directed movements, and then explore whether similar
attention-specific processes could mediate the course of development.
4. Accomplishing change when learning to visually control movement
4.1. Explicit learning
The teaching methods that are deemed most appropriate to reach the stage of automatic,
smooth, effortless and fast control of goal-directed movements are closely linked with the
investigators’—or teachers’—perspective on learning. In the tradition of the idea’s of Fitts
and Posner (1967), many investigators have argued that novice performance is based on ex-
plicit, declarative knowledge3 that is held in working memory and monitored in a step-by-step
fashion (Beilock & Carr, 2001). The implication is an emphasis on instruction methods that
induce verbal monitoring of the movement in the initial phase of motor learning. However,
explicit learning is not a necessary feat. Automatic, smooth, effortless and fast control of
goal-directed movements can also be acquired implicitly, that is, without an initial phase of
explicit knowledge about the desired movement.
4.2. Implicit learning
Instead of trying to increase the novice’s awareness of the desired movement, implicit learn-
ing methods aim to suppress the accumulation of explicit knowledge about how the movement
should be executed. Several means have been employed to accomplish implicit learning; the
use of cognitive secondary tasks while practicing the action (e.g., MacMahon & Masters, 2002;
Masters, 1992), the use of an analogy that functions to integrate the complex structure of the de-
sired movement in a simple metaphor (e.g., Liao & Masters, 2001), and the use of instructions
that induce a focus on the external effects of the movement rather than the movement pattern
per se (e.g., Wulf, Höß, & Prinz, 1998). Although strictly speaking the latter is perhaps not truly
implicit learning, these methods have in common that they intend to draw the beginner’s aware-
ness away from movement execution. Learning without instructions (i.e., discovery learning)
does not suffice, since it has been found to result in the accumulation of explicit knowledge
(e.g., Masters, 1992). There is now a growing body of evidence that the (visual) control of
goal-directed movements can not only be learned implicitly, but that it may even be beneficial
over both traditional explicit and discovery learning. With the exception of the use of secondary
tasks, implicit learning methods are shown to lead to higher levels of performance after the
same amount of practice. In addition, implicit learning results in performance that better with-
506 J. Van der Kamp et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 495–515
stands psychological stress. That is, the liability to the well-known phenomenon of choking is
diminished in comparison to explicitly learned movements, which are much more prone to the
recurrence of explicit step-by-step monitoring (i.e., the reinvestment of verbalisable rules) as
reflected in broken and stuttered movement execution.
Recently, Farrow and Abernethy (2002; see also Green & Flowers, 1991) have demonstrated
that implicit learning can also invoke learners to attend to different optic variables (i.e., edu-
cation of attention). Intermediate skilled junior players were required to return the opponent’s
tennis service on court under different visual occlusion conditions (i.e., a pair of liquid crystal
spectacles were made opaque at various instances before and after racquet–ball contact of the
service). The impact of both implicit and explicit learning on the ability to predict the direction
of the serve was assessed. Two groups received physical and video-based perceptual training.
The explicit learning group was instructed about the relationship between advance information
and the service direction (see Section 3.2.2). The implicit learning group, in contrast, was in-
structed to estimate ball speed without receiving explicit verbalisable rules for the task. Seven
of the eight learners in the implicit group, which actually had acquired less explicit rules, im-
proved performance after training. This improvement involved the use of information from the
phase before racquet–ball contact, that is, the key period that typically differentiates experts
from novices and where racquet head motion and arm movement and speed best predict the
future direction of the ball (Abernethy, 1990). The implication is that the implicit, but not the
explicit, instruction led the learners to attend to more useful sources of information. Implicit
learning removes the need for the beginning learner to describe verbally the specific information
sources he needs to attend to, or the specific movements he or she has to perform (Magill, 1998).
4.3. Implicit learning best befits vision for action
Why would explicit and implicit learning methods affect the course of learning to visually
control goal-directed movements in a different way? Unfortunately, except for propositions
about the reduced liability for choking (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992), there are
not many systematic attempts to explain why implicit learning would be advantageous (cf. Beek,
2000; Hodges & Franks, 2002). For instance, Wulf and Prinz (2001), who adhere to the theory
of common coding for action and perception, argue that movements are planned and controlled
by intended outcomes, which are the result of perceived environmental events produced by
previous movements. Because only distal events allow for a commensurate common coding of
perception and action, movements should be more effectively learned in terms of their effects
rather than in terms of specific movement patterns. However, this hypothesis is open to many
questions. Not the least is the hesitation uttered by the authors themselves: “Yet, because the
theory is relatively abstract, it does not specifically predict the differential effects of external
vs. internal foci” (Wulf & Prinz, 2001, p. 656).
In contrast to Wulf and Prinz (2001), we plea for the existence of anatomically and function-
ally separate, but interacting vision for action and vision for perception systems. Although both
systems can be involved in the visual guidance of goal-directed movement, the vision for action
system is designated to do so (see Section 2.2). Hence, the typical way to improve the visual
control of movement, that is, to induce a change in the optic variables that are coupled to the
movement variables or a change in the lawful relation between the two, would be to accomplish
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change within the vision for action system. If we assume that such change is best achieved by
a method that best fits the characteristics of the vision for action system, than implicit learning
methods would be pre-eminent in accomplishing such improvements in the visual control of
goal-directed movement. That is, given that on-line control of movement through the vision
for action system is fast, short-lived and inaccessible to consciousness, a method that draws
the beginner’s awareness away from the execution of the movement would be preferable. It is
difficult to conceive how the explicit step-by-step monitoring or use of verbalisable rules that is
so characteristic for explicit learning could induce changes within the vision for action system.
That is not to say, however, that explicit learning strategies cannot bring about improvements
in the visual control of movement. It can, but explicit verbalisations (and time delays) may
perturb or even suppress the specialised vision for action system and enforce the involvement
of the alternative route through the vision for perception system in the visual control of move-
ment (see Section 2.2). Hence, explicitly learning—we hypothesise—would typically involve
the route via the vision for perception system, where control is slow, explicit and based on
allocentric as opposed to egocentric sources of information. In this case, learning implies some
transfer of control from the vision for perception system to the specialised vision for action
system. Moreover, automatic, smooth effortless and fast control initially acquired through ex-
plicit learning methods may remain particularly susceptible to control through the alternative
vision for perception system (e.g., choking).
Beek (2000) suggested that “implicit learning is the rule, while explicit learning is the
exception” (p. 552). We argue that it is the fit between the characteristics of implicit learning
and the vision for action system that makes implicit learning more apt than explicit learning in
improving the visual control of goal-directed movement. There is one more point we would like
to stress before we explore the issue of implicit and explicit learning in the early development
of the visual control of movement. We do not aim for a framework that saddles explicit learning
with a supporting part. Bear in mind that we argued that the learning to set-up action (i.e., the
discovery of the control law) reflects changes in the integration between vision for perception
and vision for action (see Section 3.3). Explicit learning, therefore, may be particularly effective
in learning what action is appropriate. PET-scan studies have shown a learning-related increase
in the activity of the ventral vision for perception stream and a concomitant decrease in the
activity of the dorsal vision for action stream, when subjects had to learn which of four gestures
to perform when one of four non-sense figures was presented (Passingham & Toni, 2001; Toni
& Passingham, 1999; see also Lagarde, Li, Thon, Magill, & Erbani, 2002). Interestingly, in
most implicit learning studies participants were told or knew what action was appropriate (e.g.,
putting in Masters, 1992 or slalom-like movements in Wulf et al., 1998), and hence learning
was restricted to the refinement of the visual control of goal-directed movements.
5. Accomplishing change in the development of the visual control of movement
5.1. Introduction
In this final section, we explore how change in the visual control of goal-directed movements
during development can be accomplished. We inquire whether the same implicit and explicit
508 J. Van der Kamp et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 495–515
processes of change that are found to affect the rate of learning may also mediate the course
of development. Obviously, any definitive solution would be highly speculative. Our aim,
therefore, is to only outline some of the building blocks that we think would eventually be
part of the answer. To this end, we discuss the proposition that implicit as opposed to explicit
learning is age-independent, which often goes hand in hand with the commonly accepted idea
that implicit learning is the typical process that accomplishes developmental change in the
visual control of goal-directed movements. We then explore whether explicit learning might
also influence the course of development during infancy by pushing the hypothesis to its limits.
A brief comparison between the changes that occur in the visual control of movement during
development and learning brings the article to an end.
5.2. Implicit learning in development
Reber (1992) argued that implicit learning is a very basic process of considerable evolution-
ary antiquity that antedates explicit learning. Evolutionary older systems have greater stability.
Therefore, implicit learning should show little in the way of inter-individual variability in com-
parison to the more recently evolved explicit learning processes. It is anticipated that implicit
learning emerges early in development and shows few effects of age. Many authors have al-
luded to this idea (e.g., Beek, 2000; Bertenthal, 1996; Vinter & Perruchet, 2000). Bertenthal
(1996), for instance, holds that “with exploration of their own actions and the environment,
infants show increasing sensitivity to perceptual changes and finer control of actions that are
guided by this information. In essence, then, learning is implicit or procedural: it is elicited by
context, not by recall of explicit information about how to coordinate sensorimotor behaviors”
(p. 453). This putative predominance of implicit learning processes in the development of
the visual control of movement, or their presumed equality, fits with the proposal that the
fast, implicit and short-lived vision for action processes are functionally dissociated from and
follow different developmental trajectories than the explicit vision for perception processes
(Bertenthal, 1996; Van der Kamp & Savelsbergh, 2000; see Section 2.3).
All the same, when it comes to hard data about implicit learning in the development of
the visual control of movement, there is nothing like the empirical support that we found
for learning to (visually) control movement. Nevertheless, a few studies do speak for the hy-
pothesis that implicit learning processes in the context of the visual control of movement are
age-independent and emerge early. Vinter and Perruchet (2000) examined the learning of new
drawing behaviour of children between the ages of 4 and 10 years. Children received a train-
ing to fast and accurately trace a set of familiar geometrical figures where a point indicated
where to start and an arrow specified in what direction to move. In one group a large percent-
age of these indications ran counter to a natural covariation that exists in drawing between
the direction of movement and the starting position (e.g., a circle is drawn counter clockwise
if the starting point is set above a virtual axis going from 11 o’clock to 5 o’clock). It was
found that independent of age the children modified their natural drawing behaviour with-
out being aware that they were doing so (as indicated by a questionnaire). Clohessy, Posner,
and Rothbart (2001) showed that infants as young as 4 months could learn anticipatory eye
movements to unambiguous sequences of targets (e.g., 1-2-3 1-2-3, etc.). Since learning in
these infants was similar as in adults who were unaware of the sequence, the authors argued
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that the infants’ learning was based on implicit learning processes. It was only after 18 months
that infants were able to learn to anticipate the more complex context-dependent sequences
(e.g., 1-2-1-3-1-2-1-3, etc.), the performance of which was related to language ability (and
perhaps explicit learning?).
In sum, the contribution of implicit learning processes in the development of the visual con-
trol of movement seems commonly accepted and can be theoretically underpinned. However,
it would be premature to conclude that implicit learning processes can affect the course of
the early development of the visual control of movement, not to mention the occurrence of
developmental change.
5.3. Explicit learning in development
5.3.1. Explicit learning: a stringent interpretation
Explicit learning to visually control movement refers to improvements based on the accu-
mulation of explicit knowledge about how the desired movement should be executed. Explicit
knowledge is made up of information that we are aware of and, therefore, able to verbalise
(Masters, 1992; see also Magill, 1998; Reber, 1992). If we adhere to this stringent definition
then explicit learning can not take place before the end of infancy. Only after language ability
develops, which in Western cultures often goes hand in hand with the introduction into some
sort of physical education or training, children become susceptible to the type of verbal mon-
itoring induced by explicit learning. Couched within the general evolutionary heuristic, the
impossibility of explicit learning before the end of infancy could be considered advantageous.
Explicit learning processes might have been eliminated from affecting the course of the early
development of the visual control of goal-directed movements like grasping, walking and so
on, because these basic milestones need more robustness in the face of pressure or disorders
(Reber, 1992).
5.3.2. Explicit learning: a soft interpretation
We posit that explicit learning to improve the visual control of movement would typically
involve the alternative route through the vision for perception system (Section 4.3). If this
proposition is true, which remains to be proven, then we could perhaps loosen the criteria by
which we can empirically establish whether the course of development of the visual control
of movement can be affected by explicit learning processes. These criteria would not contain
the requirement to be able to verbally articulate the information about the desired movement
(e.g., Masters, 1992). Instead, the infant should in some other way be able to give evidence
that she or he is aware of the information about the desired movement pattern (see also note 3).
One possible implementation is to demonstrate that the infant is perceptually aware of his or
her movements. To pursue the argument one step further, explicit learning processes in early
development would imply a positive relationship between the infants’ perceptual awareness
of his or her movements and the improvements in the visual control of movement. We are not
familiar with any research examining such relationship. Nevertheless, there are at least two
prerequisites for such a relationship to be possible at all. First, infants should show some sort
of perceptual awareness of their movements, and second, infants should be able to visually
control their movements through the vision for perception system.
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Infants’ perceptual awareness of their movements can be assessed with preference looking
procedures, which is presumed to tap vision for perception processes. Rochat and Morgan
(1995; see also Rochat, 1998; Rochat & Striano, 2000) presented 3–5 month olds on-line
with two different views of their own moving legs. The infants preferentially looked at the
view in which the direction that the legs move was mirrored. A later study indicated that
this looking preference reversed when a ball was presented next to one of the legs; the in-
fants looked longer and kicked more when the non-mirrored view was presented (Rochat,
1998). Rochat suggests that the infants apparently “function interchangeably in relation to
these two goals, which correspond to doing (perceiving-acting, i.e., kicking) and probing
(recognizing and representing, i.e., exploring novel, unfamiliar calibration of the legs in re-
lation to familiar one)” (Rochat, 1998, p. 107; italics in original). In other words, at the age
of 3 months, infants have some perceptual awareness of the direction in which their legs
move, and this awareness appears to be independent from the visual control of those kick-
ing movements. Hence, at 3 months, the first prerequisite that some type of explicit learn-
ing processes may be feasible seems met (see also Van der Meer, Van der Weel, & Lee,
1995).
What about the second prerequisite, the ability to visually control movement through the
vision for perception system? The introduction of a temporal delay between the detection
of information and the initiation of the movement is one of the specific conditions under
which control through the vision for perception can be induced (see Section 2.2). Two types
of experimental manipulation in infant studies provide insight in this matter; reaching in the
dark and reaching for temporally occluded moving objects. It is a matter of dispute at what
age infants can reach for non-sounding objects that are invisible throughout the entire reach,
including its initiation. Recently, McCarty, Clifton, Ashmead, Lee, and Goubet (2001) have
found that it is only at 9 months that infants reach when vision of the object is removed prior to
reach onset (cf. Hood & Willats, 1986; Jonsson & Von Hofsten, 2003; Van der Meer et al., 1994).
Unfortunately, however, this and other studies do not provide sufficiently detailed kinematics
to assess whether errors in reaching were aligned with an allocentric frame of reference, as
would be predicted were reaching controlled through the vision for perception system (see
Section 2.2).
In sum, there is some empirical support for the contention that infants can be aware of
their movements, but little when it comes to infants’ visual control of movements through the
vision for perception system. However, the evidence so far is not contradictory either. It ap-
pears not completely unfeasible, therefore, that explicit learning processes (i.e., in a less strict
interpretation) can occur early in development. Perhaps we could induce them by drawing on
observations that for infants between 9 and 12 months, adults can, by changing gaze coupled
with a head turn and/or a pointing gesture and later with verbal encouragement, direct infants’
visual attention (e.g., Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Flom & Pick, 2003).
6. Concluding remarks
In our inquiry into the changes of the visual control of goal-directed movement during
development and learning, we felt impelled to bring together theory and observations from
J. Van der Kamp et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 495–515 511
sometimes fairly disparate fields of study. Although such a merging of ideas can be (and
hopefully is) very fruitful, it has the drawback that many of the hypothetical relations still
need empirical verification—or falsification. Any definitive conclusions, therefore, would be
premature. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, it appears justified to assume that both the
development and learning of the visual control of goal-directed movements are governed by a
change toward the use of more useful and specifying optic variables. Hence, whether it concerns
a change that occurs in the vast majority of infants under the most varied conditions and within
a fairly narrowly delimited age period (i.e., development), or whether it only concerns change
observed in a few individuals subjected to specific conditions (i.e., learning), the change often
involves a change in optic variable use. We have argued that this makes intuitive sense given the
organisation of the visual control of movement. The on-line, fast, short-lived and implicit vision
for action system, to which we are referring, provides important constraints for the manner in
which change can be accomplished, both during development and learning. It is, therefore, that
implicit learning processes, in which the learner’s awareness of how the desired movement
should be executed is minimised, are pre-eminent in inducing changes in the visual control of
movement. This needs to be qualified for the age-related changes, because the empirical support
for the effect of implicit processes in the course of development is meagre. Notwithstanding
this, it seems much more reasonable that it is explicit learning that makes the difference between
development and learning to visually control movement. However, if one is prepared to use
the ability to demonstrate perceptual awareness as a criterion then the contribution of explicit
learning processes in the development of the visual control of movement, even during infancy,
cannot be excluded.
Notes
1. One may want to argue that even novices have already discovered what actions are
appropriate simply by listening to the instructions of the investigator. The participants of
the experiment know that they have to return the ball. However, to the extent that they still
have to find out, for instance, whether the ball should be returned either with a backhand
or forehand stroke, there are still affordances to be discovered.
2. We follow Jacobs and Michaels (Jacobs, 2001; Jacobs & Michaels, 2002) who in the
context of perception refer to a variable as specifying only if it specifies the prop-
erty that the perceiver intends to perceive, and to a non-specifying variable when it
does not specify that property. Previously, the more arbitrary terms higher and lower
order variables have been used to refer to a similar distinction (e.g., Kayed & Van
der Meer, 2000; Michaels & De Vries, 1998; Van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Smeets,
1997).
3. Magill (1998, p. 105) defines explicit knowledge as “information we can verbally
describe, or in some other way give evidence that we are ‘consciously aware of’
the information.” The second part of this definition may provide the opportunity to
apply the concept of explicit knowledge in early human development as well (see
section 5.3.2).
512 J. Van der Kamp et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 495–515
Acknowledgments
This paper was written while the first author was supported by the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research (NWO), Grant Number 490-00-243. Parts of the paper were originally
presented at the symposium “Development, Learning and Practice: What is the difference?’
held in Alsager, UK. Various individuals have contributed valuable criticisms, suggestions,
and questions. The authors are particularly indebted to Simone Caljouw, Bernard Netelenbos,
Remco Polman, Arenda te Velde, Hemke van Doorn, and Rob Withagen for stimulating ideas
and helpful comments.
References
Abernethy, B. (1990). Expertise, visual search, and the information pick-up in squash. Perception, 19, 63–77.
Abernethy, B., & Russell, D. G. (1987). Expert-novice differences in an applied selective attention task. Journal of
Sport Psychology, 9, 326–345.
Adolph, K. E. (1997). Learning in the development of infant locomotion. Monographs of the Society for Research
in Child Development, 62(3, Serial No. 251).
Adolph, K. E. (2000). Specificity of learning: Why infants fall over a veritable cliff. Psychological Science, 11,
290–295.
Atkinson, J. (2000). The developing visual brain. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Beek, P. J. (2000). Toward a theory of learning in the perceptual-motor domain. International Journal of Sport
Psychology, 31, 547–554.
Beilock, S. L., & Carr, T. H. (2001). On the fragility of skilled performance: What governs choking under pressure?
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 4, 701–725.
Bertenthal, B. I. (1996). Origins and early development of perception, action and representation. Annual Review of
Psychology, 47, 431–459.
Bridgeman, B., Kirch, M., & Sperling, A. (1981). Segration of cognitive and motor aspects of visual function using
induced motion. Perception and Psychophysics, 29, 336–342.
Bridgeman, B., Peery, S., & Anand, S. (1997). Interaction of cognitive and sensorimaps of visual space. Perception
and Psychophysics, 59, 336–342.
Butterworth, G. E., & Cochran, E. (1980). Towards a mechanism of joint visual attention in human infancy. Inter-
national Journal of Behavioral Development, 3, 253–272.
Carrozzo, M., Stratta, F., McIntyre, J., & Lacquaniti, F. (2002). Cognitive allocentric representations of visual space
shape pointing errors. Experimental Brain Research, 147, 426–436.
Caraugh, J. H., & Janelle, C. M. (2002). Visual search and cue utilisation in racket sports. In K. Davids, G.
Savelsbergh, S. J. Bennett, & J. Van der Kamp (Eds.), Interceptive actions in sport: Information and movement
(pp. 64–89). London: Routledge.
Clohessy, A. B., Posner, M. I., & Rothbart, M. K. (2001). Development of the functional visual field. Acta Psy-
chologia, 106, 51–68.
Creem, S. H., & Proffitt, D. R. (2001). Defining the cortical systems: “What”, “where”, and “how”. Acta Psycho-
logica, 107, 43–68.
Eppler, M. A., & Adolph, K. E. (1996). Toward an ecological approach to perceptual learning and development:
Commentary on Michaels and Beek. Ecological Psychology, 8, 353–355.
Farrow, D., & Abernethy, B. (2002). Can anticipatory skills be learned through implicit video-based perceptual
training? Journal of Sports Sciences, 20, 471–485.
Fitts, P. M., & Posner, M. I. (1967). Human performance. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Flom, R., & Pick, A. D. (2003). Verbal encouragement and joint attention in 18-month-old infants. Infant Behavior
& Development, 26, 121–134.
J. Van der Kamp et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 495–515 513
Gentilucci, M., Benuzzi, F., Bertolani, L., Daprati, E., & Gangitano, M. (2000). Language and motor control.
Experimental Brain Research, 133, 468–490.
Gentilucci, M., Benuzzi, F., Bertolani, L., & Gangitano, M. (2001). Visual illusions and the control of children arm
movements. Neuropsychologia, 39, 132–139.
Gentilucci, M., Chieffi, S., Daprati, E., Saetti, M. C., & Toni, I. (1996). Visual illusion and action. Neuropsychologia,
34, 369–376.
Gibson, E. J. (1969). Principles of perceptual learning and development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.
Gibson, E. J. (1988). Exploratory behavior in the development of perceiving, acting, and the acquiring of knowledge.
Annual Review of Psychology, 39, 1–41.
Gibson, E. J., & Pick, A. D. (2001). Perceptual learning and development: An ecological approach. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gibson, E. J., Riccio, G., Schmuckler, M. A., Stoffregen, T. A., Rosenberg, D., & Taormina, J. (1987). Detection
of the traversability of surfaces by crawling and walking infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 13, 533–544.
Gibson, E. J., & Walk, R. D. (1960). The ‘visual cliff’. Scientific American, 202, 64–71.
Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston, MA: Hougthon Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J., & Gibson, E. J. (1955). Perceptual learning: Differentiation or enrichment? Psychological Review,
62, 32–41.
Goodale, M. A. (1998). Visuomotor control: Where does vision end and action begin? Current Biology, 8, R489–
R491.
Goodale, M. A., & Humphrey, G. K. (1998). The objects of action and perception. Cognition, 67, 181–207.
Goodale, M. A., & Murphy, K. J. (1996). Action and perception in the visual periphery. In P. Their & H.-O. Karnath
(Eds.), Parietal lobe contributions to orientation in 3D space (pp. 447–461). Heidelberg: Springer.
Green, T. D., & Flowers, J. H. (1991). Implicit versus explicit learning process in a probalistic, continuous fine
motor catching task. Journal of Motor Behavior, 23, 293–300.
Hanisch, C., Konczak, J., & Dohle, C. (2001). The effect of the Ebbinghaus illusion on grasping behaviour of
children. Experimental Brain Research, 137, 237–245.
Hodges, N. J., & Franks, I. M. (2002). Modelling coaching practice: The role of instruction and demonstration.
Journal of Sport Sciences, 20, 793–811.
Hood, B., & Willats, P. (1986). Reaching in the dark to an object’s remembered position: Evidence for object
permanence in 5-month-old infants. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, 57–65.
Jacobs, D. M. (2001). On perceiving, acting and learning: Toward an ecological approach anchored in convergence.
Utrecht, The Netherlands: Digital Printing Partners Utrecht BV.
Jacobs, D. M., & Michaels, C. F. (2002). On the apparent paradox of learning and realism. Ecological Psychology,
14, 127–139.
Jeannerrod, M. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Jonsson, B., & Von Hofsten, C. (2003). Infants’ ability to track and reach for temporally occluded objects. Devel-
opmental Science, 6, 86–99.
Kaufman, J., Mareschal, D., & Johnson, M. H. (2003). Graspability and object processing in infancy. Infant Behavior
& Development 26, 516–528.
Kayed, N. S., & Van der Meer, A. (2000). Timing strategies used in defensive blinking to optical collisions in 5- to
7-month-old infants. Infant Behavior & Development, 23, 253–270.
Kovács, I. (2000). Human development of perceptual organization. Vision Research, 40, 1301–1310.
Lagarde, J., Li, L., Thon, B., Magill, R., & Erbani, E. (2002). Interactions between human explicit and implicit
perceptual motor learning shown by kinematic variables. Neuroscience Letters, 327, 66–70.
Liao, C. M., & Masters, R. S. W. (2001). Analogy learning: A means to implicit motor learning. Journal of Sport
Sciences, 19, 307–319.
Lee, D. N., Young, D. S., Reddish, P. E., Lough, S., & Clayton, T. M. H. (1983). Visual timing in hitting an
accelerating ball. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 35A, 333–346.
MacMahon, K. M. A., & Masters, R. S. W. (2002). The effects of secondary tasks on implicit motor skill performance.
International Journal of Sport Psychology, 33, 307–324.
514 J. Van der Kamp et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 495–515
Magill, R. A. (1998). Knowledge is more than we can talk about: Implicit learning in motor skill acquisition.
Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 69, 104–110.
Marotta, J. J., Behrmann, M., & Goodale, M. A. (1997). The removal of binocular cues disrupts the calibration of
grasping in patients with visual form agnosia. Experimental Brain Research, 116, 113–121.
Masters, R. W. S. (1992). Knowledge, knerves, know-how: The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the
breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343–358.
McCarty, M. E., Clifton, R. K., Ashmead, D. H., Lee, P., & Goubet, N. (2001). How infants use vision for grasping
objects. Child Development, 72, 973–987.
Michaels, C. F. (2000). Information, perception and action: What should ecological psychologists learn from Milner
and Goodale (1995)? Ecological Psychology, 12, 241–258.
Michaels, C., & Beek, P. (1995). The state of ecological psychology. Ecological Psychology, 7, 259–278.
Michaels, C. F., & De Vries, M. M. (1998). Higher order and lower variables in the visual perception of relative
pulling force. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24, 526–546.
Milner, A. D., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Needham, A., Barrett, T., & Peterman, K. (2002). A pick-me-up for infants’ exploratory skills: Early simulated
experiences reaching for objects using ‘sticky mittens’ enhances young infants’ object exploration skills. Infant
Behavior & Development, 25, 269–278.
Newman, C., Atkinson, J., & Braddick, O. (2001). The development of reaching and looking preferences in infants
to objects of different sizes. Developmental Psychology, 37, 561–572.
Norman, J. (2002). Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist
and ecological approaches. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 25, 73–137.
Oudejans, R. R. D., Bleijendaal, I., Koedijker, J. M., &, Bakker, F. C. (2003). Training visual control in basketball
jump shooting. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Pagano, C. C., & Bingham, G. P. (1998). Comparing measures of monocular distance perception: Verbal and
reaching errors are not correlated. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
24, 1037–1051.
Passingham, R. E., & Toni, I. (2001). Contrasting the dorsal and ventral visual systems: Guidance of movement
versus decision making. Neuroimage, 141, 125–131.
Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. New York: Basic Books.
Pick, H. L., Jr. (2003). Development and learning: A historical perspective on acquisition of motor control. Infant
Behavior & Development 26, 441–448.
Postma, A., Van der Lubbe, R., & Zuidhoek, S. (2002). The ventral stream offers more affordance and the dorsal
stream more memory than believed. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 25, 115–116.
Reber, A. S. (1992). An evolutionary context for the cognitive unconscious. Philosophical Psychology, 5, 33–51.
Rochat, P. (1998). Self-perception and action in infancy. Experimental Brain Research, 123, 102–109.
Rochat, P., & Morgan, R. (1995). Spatial determinants in the perception of self-produced leg movements by 3- to
5-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 31, 626–636.
Rochat, P., & Striano, T. (2000). Perceived self in infancy. Infant Behavior & Development, 23, 513–530.
Rossetti, Y. (1998). Implicit perception in action: Short-lived motor representation of space. Consciousness and
Cognition, 7, 520–558.
Rossetti, Y., & Pisella, L. (2002). Several ‘vision for action’ systems: A guide to dissociating and integrating dorsal
and ventral functions. In W. Prinz & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention
and Performance XIX (pp. 62–119). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Runeson, S., Juslin, P., & Olsson, H. (2000). Visual perception of dynamic properties: Cue heuristics versus
direct-perceptual competence. Psychological Review, 107, 617–632.
Savelsbergh, G. J. P., Van der Kamp, J., Oudejans, R. R. D., & Scott, M. (2004). Perceptual learning is mastering
perceptual degrees of freedom. In A. M. Williams & N. J. Hodges (Eds.), Skill acquisition in sport: Research,
theory and practice. London, UK: Routledge (in press).
Stoffregen, T. A., Schmuckler, M. A., & Gibson, E. J. (1987). Use of central and peripheral optical flow in stance
and locomotion in young walkers. Perception, 16, 113–119.
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
J. Van der Kamp et al. / Infant Behavior & Development 26 (2003) 495–515 515
Toni, I., & Passingham, R. E. (1999). Prefrontal-basal ganglia pathways are involved in the learning of arbitrary
visuomotor associations. Experimental Brain Research, 127, 19–32.
Van der Kamp, J., Bennett, S. J., Savelsbergh, G. J. P., & Davids, K. (1999). Timing a catch: II. Adaptation to
telestereoscopic viewing. Experimental Brain Research, 129, 369–377.
Van der Kamp, J., & Savelsbergh, G. (2000). Action and perception in infancy. Infant Behavior & Development,
23, 237–251.
Van der Kamp, J., & Savelsbergh, G. (2002). On the development of the two visual systems. Behavioural & Brain
Sciences, 25, 120.
Van der Kamp, J., Savelsbergh, G., & Rosengren, K. (2001). The separation of action and perception and the issue
of affordances. Ecological Psychology, 13, 167–172.
Van der Kamp, J., Savelsbergh, G., & Smeets, J. (1997). Multiple information sources in interceptive timing. Human
Movement Sciences, 16, 787–821.
Van der Meer, A. L. H., Van der Weel, F. R., & Lee, D. N. (1994). Prospective control in catching by infants.
Perception, 23, 287–302.
Van der Meer, A. L. H., Van der Weel, F. R., & Lee, D. N. (1995). The functional significance of arm movements
in neonates. Science, 267, 693–695.
Van Hof, P., & Van der Kamp, J. (2003, April 24–27). Visual control of interceptive actions in infancy. Poster
Presented at the 2003 Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Tampa, FL.
Van Hof, P., Van der Kamp, J., & Savelsbergh, G. (2004). The information-based control of interceptive actions: A
developmental perspective. In H. Hecht & G. J. P. Savelsbergh (Eds.), Time-to-contact. Amsterdam: Elsevier,
North-Holland (in press).
Vinter, A., & Perruchet, P. (2000). Implicit learning in children is not related to age: Evidence form drawing behavior.
Child Development, 71, 1223–1240.
Von Hofsten, C. (1983). Catching skills in infancy. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 9, 75–85.
Yonas, A., & Hartman, B. (1993). Perceiving the affordance of contact in four- and five-month-old infants. Child
Development, 64, 298–308.
Warren, W. H. (1988). The perception-action coupling. In H. Bloch & B. I. Bertenthal (Eds.), Sensory-motor
organizations and development in infancy and early childhood (pp. 23–37). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Wattam-Bell, J. (1996). Infants’ discrimination of absolute direction of motion. Investigative Ophthalmology and
Visual Science, 37, S137.
Westwood, D. A., McEachern, T., & Roy, E. A. (2001). Delayed grasping of a Müller-Lyer figure. Experimental
Brain Research, 141, 166–173.
Williams, A. M., Davids, K., & Williams, J. G. (1999). Visual perception & action in sport. London: E&FN Spon.
Withagen, R., & Michaels, C. F. (2002). The calibration of walking transfers to crawling: Are action systems
calibrated? Ecological Psychology, 14, 223–234.
Wohlwill, J. F. (1970). The age variable in psychological research. Psychological Review, 77, 49–64.
Wohlwill, J. F. (1973). The study of behavioral development. New York: Academic Press.
Wulf, G., Höß, M., & Prinz, W. (1998). Instructions for motor learning: Differential effects of internal versus
external focus of attention. Journal of Motor Behavior, 30, 169–179.
Wulf, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). Directing attention to movement effects enhances learning: A review. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 8, 648–660.
